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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the relationship between political instability, measured by a 
country’s Polity2 decmocratization score, and economic performance, measured by 
the GDP per capita.  We use data from 1985 to 2002 for 25 countries in five different 
regions: Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia.  The results of the empirical models in this paper show a significant 
relationship between democracy and economic growth, but no significant sign of 
endogeneity (joint causality) as suggested by previous research.  This paper also finds 
the ‘optimal’ Polity2 score that maximizes GDP per capita in each of the five regions. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the nature of the relationship between political instability and 
economic growth in a country?  This question has been the subject of a long-standing 
debate among many economists and political scientists. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between instability and growth.  We 
consider different issues on which social scientists disagree, such as the direction of 
causality and the measurement of political instability.  On the direction of causality, 
we consider the hypothesis that political instability causes slower economic growth 
and the hypothesis that both political instability and economic growth are 
endogenous.  We look at data from countries across five different regions to study the 
correlation between instability and growth and to determine any region-specific 
factors that affect this relationship.  As for the measurement of political instability, 
this paper provides a description of an ideal data set that, in a perfect world, would be 
used to study the relationship.  Given limitations on data, however, this paper uses a 
measure that only considers one aspect of political instability: democratization.   
This paper adds to some of the previous literature by considering the idea of 
an optimal level of political instability in different regions.  We construct five 
polynomials, one for each of the regions being studied, and find the level of political 
instability ‘needed’ in order to maximize economic performance. 
This paper is divided into seven sections.  Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
framework and previous literature on the relationship between political instability and 
economic performance.  Section 3 discusses the conceptual models underlying this 
relationship.  Section 4 gives a description of data that would be used in an ideal 
world to study this subject.  Section 5 describes the data and measurements used in 
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this study.  In section 6, we present the empirical models and the results, and, finally, 
section 7 concludes this study and provides recommendations for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
The basic theory underlying the relationship between political systems and 
economic growth was discussed in a paper by McGuire and Olson (1996).  The 
analysis in that paper centered around three forms of political organization: anarchy, 
dictatorship and democracy.  In anarchy, “roving bandits” rule the land and have no 
interest in the public good.  They use their armies to maximize their own income, and 
citizens have no incentive to produce.  Hence, total income in anarchy is very low. 
In the Mcguire/Olson model, “stationary bandits” settle down and create an 
autocracy with a monopoly of theft.  Since these rulers have a stake in the 
productivity of their people, they tend to tax moderately and provide some public 
goods.  This leaves the people with an incentive to have a higher level of production.  
Autocrats, however still seek to maximize their personal wealth and extract a 
significant amount of rent from the citizenry.  
The authors argue democracies will tend to provide a higher level of public 
goods and engage in less rent extraction than in autocracy.  The reason for this is that, 
even under simple majority rule, citizens’ “encompassing interest” will naturally limit 
rent seeking when it reduces total income by more than the rent extracted from the 
minority.  McGuire and Olson show that with perfect targeting---in which the rent 
extracting program goes entirely to the majority—a 51 percent majority will stop rent 
seeking when it decreases total income by 2 units for every unit of rent.  Under 
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imperfect targeting, in which some fraction of the minority receives the benefit, rent 
seeking behavior will be even lower.  This is equally beneficial to the entire 
population, which includes all minorities.  And since public goods are needed to 
produce output, the “super-encompassing” nature of democracies leads to higher 
economic growth. 
The key to the McGuire/Olson model is, however, the credibility of the 
“monopoly of theft” on the part of the government.  If the autocrat is in an uncertain 
position, or if the citizens believe the government’s position is uncertain, the incentive 
to invest in public goods and increase income is reduced.  Hence political instability 
which undermines the government’s long-run credibility should have detrimental 
effects on economic performance. 
Olson (1991) also gives a theoretical background on the relationship between 
instability and economic growth.  The paper further discusses the “super-
encompassing” nature of democracies, citing examples such as the incentives of 
democratic leaders to lead a stable economy in order to run for reelection.  Olson also 
argues that political instability is the cause for slower economic growth, and not vice 
versa, although the “demand for democracy” may rise with increased income. 
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) and De Haan and Siermann (1996) 
provide two, more explicit theoretical arguments for why political instability slows 
down economic growth.  The first paper uses the concept of uncertainty.  A high 
propensity of government change (which may be considered as a measure of political 
instability) often leads to uncertainty about the policies of the new government.  As a 
result, investors would exit the economy, and potential investors would seek a more 
stable environment.  The second paper says that instability reduces the supply of both 
capital and labor.  This, in turn, discourages investment due to the increased risk of 
capital loss.  Also, political turmoil causes capital flight and brain drain and hampers 
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the establishment of property rights, which are necessary in order to realize 
productivity gains.   
 
2.2 Previous Empirical Research 
 While social scientists have long recognized the relationship between political 
instability and economic performance, our empirical understanding of this 
relationship is limited.  The literature is divided in many dimensions.  There is little 
consensus on the direction of causality, the definition and measurement of political 
instability and the type of data capable of yielding an accurate test of the various 
theories. 
A central question in this research is the direction of causality: does a more 
stable political environment lead to economic prosperity, or does economic prosperity 
set the stage for political stability?  The empirical research is divided into three 
schools of thought.  The first argues that political instability causes slower (or, 
sometimes, faster) economic growth (Campos and Nugent (2000)).  The second 
school of thought argues that economic performance drives political stability 
(Zablotsky (1996)), while a third group claims that causality runs both ways 
(Kirmanoglu (2003)). 
In addition to approaching the issue of causality from a variety of 
perspectives, the empirical research is also divided on the issue of how one actually 
defines and measures political instability.  The research papers also vary in the 
regions (samples) they examine.  Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) looked 
at a panel of 113 countries, while Campos, Nugent and Robinson (1999) looked at 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa).   One advantage of a region-specific 
focus is that it allows for using measures of political instability suitable for the region.  
 5
This paper, adopts a global approach while also adding region-specific dummy 
variables to capture major regional variation. 
 Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) and de Haan and Siermann (1996) 
assert that political instability causes slower economic development.  Both papers 
used GDP as the dependent economic variable and changes in government as the 
measure for political instability.  The papers differ, however, in the way they 
quantified changes in government.  Alesina et al assigned a numerical value for each 
country by averaging the probabilities of a change in government for that country 
over several years.  They concluded that in countries and time periods with high 
propensity of government change, growth is significantly lower than otherwise.  De 
Haan et al, on the other hand, used a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the 
number of government transfers exceeds seven and 1 otherwise.  Using such a binary 
variable to measure variations in political instability within a large panel of countries 
is insufficient and is probably why the authors found no statistically significant 
relationship between instability and growth (except in Africa). 
 While also using GDP as the dependent economic variable, Campos and 
Nugent (2000) and Goldsmith (1987) each constructed their own measures for 
political instability.  Instead of using changes in government, Campos et al 
constructed two indices to measure political instability, one for mild and another for 
severe instability.  Goldsmith used a similar methodology but also incorporated 
changes in stability between two time periods.  He classified his sample into four 
groups of countries: Consistently Stable (countries that were stable in both time 
periods), Chronically Unstable (countries that were unstable in both time periods), 
Stabilizing (countries that became more stable in the later time period, compared to 
the earlier one), and Destabilizing (countries that became less stable in the later time 
period, compared to the earlier one).  Both Campos et al and Goldsmith found no 
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statistically significant relationship between political instability and economic growth.  
However, like de Haan et al, Campos et al found a significant negative relationship in 
African countries. 
The paper by Aisen and Veiga (2003) is also notable.  This paper differed 
from most of the previous literature in its use of inflation, rather than GDP, as the 
measure for economic performance.  Besides studying the relationship between 
instability and inflation, the authors also considered how instability affects inflation 
volatility.  Aisen et al found a negative relationship between instability and inflation, 
especially in countries with high inflation (compared to those with ‘moderate’ or 
‘low’ inflation, according to their classification).  The authors used the logarithm of 
inflation as the dependent variable for studying the relationship between instability 
and inflation, while they used the logarithm of the standard deviation of inflation to 
study volatility. 
 The papers discussed so far have all tested the hypothesis that political 
instability causes slow economic growth, and not vice versa.  Zablotsky (1996) 
studied the relationship from a different perspective.  He proposed that slow economic 
growth causes political instability.  The author measured growth using the percentage 
of agricultural products in a country’s GDP and political instability using the 
probability of a military coup d’etat.  Zablotsky found this probability by using an 
optimization problem, in which he looked at factors that would cause military leaders 
to participate in a coup.  The results of the paper were consistent with its stated 
hypothesis. 
Before looking into the literature on joint causality, we should mention a paper 
written by Kirmanoglu (2003) in which the author used Granger tests to study the 
direction of causality in the relationship between stability and growth.  The author 
included 19 countries in his study and used per capita GDP and an index of political 
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freedom as variables.  After transforming the series into a stationary series in order to 
be able to conduct the Granger tests, Kirmanoglu found no empirical relationship 
between instability and economic growth in 14 of the 19 countries.  In two countries, 
he found that political stability seemed to generate economic growth, while, in the 
three remaining countries, he found that the causality was in the opposite direction. 
 The third school of thought mentioned earlier in this section argues that 
causality in the relationship between political instability and economic growth runs in 
both directions.  Besides their single equation model discussed above, Alesina et al 
also included a model with simultaneous equations to address the issue of 
endogeneity.  For their political instability equation, the authors used changes in 
government as the dependent variable and several independent variables such as GDP 
per capita, cabinet changes and a dummy variable for whether a country is a 
democracy or not.   In the economic growth equation, average per capita growth in 
GDP was the dependent variable, while independent variables included proxies for the 
levels of income and human capital, region-specific dummy variables, as well as other 
control variables.  The instrumental variables used were the enrollment rate in 
primary schools, the lagged number of occurrences of an “executive adjustment” and 
the lagged number of occurrences of a coup d’etat.  Alesina et al concluded that 
economic growth and political instability are correlated and jointly endogenous, 
which means that neither of them can be taken as predetermined. 
Finally, we briefly discuss two other papers which studied the effects of 
political instability on economic growth in specific regions.  Campos, Nugent and 
Robinson (1999) looked at the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), while Brada, 
Kutan and Yigit (2004) considered countries in Central Europe and the Balkans. 
Campos et al hypothesized that domestic instability can have positive effects 
on investment in the MENA region (because governments would be induced to 
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improve policy), while external instability would have a negative impact on 
investment.   
As mentioned earlier, studying countries in one region allows for the use of 
region-specific independent variables.  Campos et al used such variables, one of 
which was a variable describing a country’s proximity to Israel.  Using data from 
1970 to 1990, the authors ended up with empirical evidence that supported their 
hypothesis. 
Brada et al studied the effects of transition and political instability on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows in Central Europe and the Balkans.  The authors 
found that the economic costs of political instability in this region have been quite 
high, especially in the Balkans.  An interesting aspect in the authors’ methodology 
here is their use of other European economies (those that are not undergoing transition 
and that are not subject to serious political instability).  To avoid bias resulting from 
different sample periods for different transition countries (because of the lack of data), 
the authors established a relationship between FDI inflows and country characteristics 
for non-transition European countries.  This gave sufficient observations to develop 
robust, unbiased estimates for transition countries.  One of the weaknesses of this 
paper, on the other hand, is that it did not include a clear measure of political 
instability but rather several proxies that represent a country’s economic 
characteristics and transition strategies, which, according to the authors, are a 
reflection of policy changes and stability. 
To conclude this section, previous literature has used various models and 
methodologies to study the relationship between political instability and economic 
performance.  There were clearly differences in the hypothesized direction of 
causality and the measures of political instability.  Most of the literature, however, 
seemed to argue that political instability causes slower economic growth (although a  
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of regressions predicting economic growth using political instability 
Paper Year 
Published 
Dependent 
Variable 
Measure(s) of 
political 
instability 
Coefficient 
estimate for 
instability 
Control 
Variables 
      
1. Cross-Sectional Regressions1 
      
de Haan 1996 GDP growth Govt. changes -0.51 
(0.5) 
Population and 
capital growth 
rates 
      
Alesina 1992 Per cap. GDP 
growth 
Govt. changes (-
1) 
-0.005 
(-1.84) 
EDUC2, 
GROWTH(-1) 
      
Campos 2000 ΔGDP SPI3 -0.128 
(-0.580) 
Institutions and 
initial income4 
      
Aisen 2003 Log(Inf) Polity25 (among 
others) 
0.025 
(2.71) 
GDP_gr, 
Real_Over6, 
Oil_ch7 
      
  Log(SDInf) Cabchg(-1) 
(among others) 
0.210 
(1.61) 
GDP(ppp, 
SD(GDP_gr)(-
1), Oil_ch, 
Agric_va, 
Trade8 
      
Goldsmith 1987 GDP Assassinations, 
executive 
transfers, armed 
attacks, deaths 
from violence 
N/A N/A 
 
2. Region-Specific Regressions 
 
Campos 1999 FDISTORT9 WAR10 (among 
others) 
-8.607 
(-2.09) 
Oil prices, 
growth(-1), 
HFDISTORT 
Brada 2004 Log(FDI11) N/A12 N/A N/A 
      
1 Although these regressions are cross-sectional, many of them contained region-specific dummy variables. 
1 EDUC: the enrollment ratio in primary school. 
1 SPI was measured using indices for mild and severe instability. 
1 The authors ran other regression with different control variables.  The results shown were obtained when institutions and initial 
income were controlled. 
1 Polity2: overall measure of political stability. 
1 Real_Over is the real effective overvaluation of the national currency. 
1 Oil_ch: percentage annual change in oil prices. 
1 Agric_va and Trade represent the percentage of GDP of the value added from agriculture and from trade, respectively. 
1 FDISTORT: freedom from distortion index. 
1 WAR takes the value 0 if a country did not participate in a war during a given year, 1 if it participated in a war, and 2 if it 
participated in a major war. 
1 FDI: foreign direct investments. 
1 Brada et al used several proxies to measure both a country’s economic characteristics and its transition strategies (which 
includes the effect of stability) 
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number of papers yielded no statistically significant results).  Like Alesina et al, this 
paper will include both a single-equation model and a simultaneous equation model to 
study the relationship between stability and growth. 
Table 1 includes a summary of previous empirical research discussed in this 
section. 
 
3. Conceptual Models 
In this paper, we include two models: a single equation model to study the 
hypothesis that political instability causes slower economic growth, and as 
simultaneous equations model to study the hypothesis that political instability and 
economic growth are jointly correlated and endogenous. 
3.1 Single Equation Model 
In this single equation model, economic growth is a function of political 
instability, as well as the growth in human capital, physical capital and technology. 
Economic growthit = f(Human capitalit, Physical capitalit, Technologyit, Political Instabilityit) 
 The first three arguments in the model above can be explained with basic 
economic theory.  Having more human capital, physical capital and technology in an 
economy leads to higher levels of growth.  As for political instability, the theoretical 
framework of this study suggests that more political instability leads to lower 
economic growth. 
3.2 Simultaneous Equations Model 
The simultaneous equations model considers the issue of endogeneity.  It 
examines the hypothesis that neither political instability nor economic growth can be 
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taken as predetermined, which means that they are both endogenous and jointly 
correlated. 
Economic growthit = f(Human capitalit, Physical capitalit, Technologyit, Political Instabilityit) 
Political Instabilityit = f(Economic growthit, Non-economic factorsit) 
 The economic growth equation is similar to the one in the single equation 
model.  The political instability equation, on the other hand, states that instability is a 
function of economic growth, as well as other non-economic factors (i.e. variables 
that affect political instability but do not affect economic growth). 
 
4. Ideal Data 
Ideally, we would like to measure political instability with variables that 
capture its different forms.  These include (1) executive changes (such as changes in 
government, changes in policies, coups, etc) and (2) military instabilities (such as 
armed conflicts, civilian deaths from conflicts, etc).  Having such measures would 
allow us to distinguish between the effects of different forms of political instability on 
economic growth. 
A suitable measure for economic growth would be comprehensive (such as 
GDP or GDP per capita).  Such a measure would give a clear picture of an economy’s 
overall performance in a particular period of time. 
Ideal measures for the non-economic factors affecting political instability 
(specified in the political instability equation of the simultaneous equations model) 
would capture all such factors, which might include the number of political parties, 
participation in elections, diplomatic relations with foreign countries, civil liberties, 
etc.  Such factors affect political instability, yet they do not significantly influence 
economic performance. 
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As for the control variables, ideal measures for human capital would capture 
the changes in the population and the quality of the effective labor force, while an 
ideal measure for physical capital would give an exact value for all the physical 
capital in an economy in a particular period.  Finally, an ideal measure for technology 
would give a quantitative value of how much new technology is being incorporated in 
an economy at a particular period of time.  Such a variable would measure things like 
the number and quality of new machines in different industries. 
 
5. Actual Data 
Our panel data set includes observations from 25 countries between the years 
1985 and 2002.  The countries are distributed evenly among five regions: Africa, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.  (See 
the data set in the Appendix for a full list of countries.) 
There is very limited, freely-available data on political instability.1  Also, 
much of the available data measures democratization, as opposed to stability per se.  
However, given the theory underlying the relationship between instability and growth 
(discussed in section 2.1), such measures of democratization would be good proxies 
for political instability.  In this paper, we use the Polity2 score as a measure for 
political instability.  Polity2 was published in the Polity IV dataset project by Monty 
G. Marshall of the University of Maryland, College Park and Keith Jaggers of 
Colorado State University in 2002.  The score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 
+10 (strongly democratic).  
                                                 
1 The Cross-National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS) includes many of the measures mentioned in 
the ‘Ideal Data’ section.  However, data in the CNTS is not available for free at Macalester College. 
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For the non-economic factors affecting political instability, we use the total 
freedom score published by Freedom House, a non-profit organization based in 
Washington, DC.  The freedom score is the sum of two separate scores, one for 
political rights and the other for civil liberties.  The total score ranges from 1 (low 
freedom) to 14 (high freedom).  Although this score is probably somewhat correlated 
with economic growth, we believe it is a good proxy for non-economic factors that 
affect a country’s democratization status in a given period of time. 
No data was available on school enrollment—the preferred measurement for 
human capital—for some of the countries being studied.  Annual population growth 
was, therefore, used instead.  Energy use (measured in kilograms of oil per capita) 
was the measure we used for physical capital, while the number of television sets per 
one thousand people was used to measure technology.  Data on GDP per capita, 
population growth, energy use and the number of TV sets were all obtained from the 
website of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
6. Empirical Models and Results 
6.1 Single Equation Model 
Given the conceptual model in section 3 and the actual data listed in section 5, 
we have the following single equation regression: 
Regression 1: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0+β1POP_GRWOTHit+β2ENG_USEit+β3TV_PER_1Kit+β4POLITY2it 
where POP_GROWTHit is the percentage of population growth in country i at year t           
          ENG_USEit is the energy use (in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita) in  
                               country i at year t 
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          TV_PER_1Kit is the number of television sets per 1,000 people in country i at  
          year t 
          POLITY2it is the Polity2 score for country i at year t 
 According to the theoretical framework discussed in section 2.1, we 
hypothesize a positive sign for β4.  An increase in democracy (i.e. decrease in 
instability) limits rent extracting and, thus, increases GDP per capita.  Also, according 
to economic theory, we hypothesize positive signs for β1, β2 and β3. 
 The results in Table 3 (on page 19) seem to be in accord with our expectations.  
A one point increase in the Polity2 score for a country in a particular time period 
increases GDP per capita by about $154.  Also, the values of all the coefficients (β’s) 
are all statistically significant. 
 We also calculated the elasticity of the Polity2 score.  Every 1% increase in 
that score would result in a 5% increase in GDP per capita.  This shows that 
democracy clearly has a significant effect on economic growth. 
 Furthermore, to test for regional variations in the relationship between 
political instability and economic performance, we constructed four, region-specific 
dummy variables and produced the following two regressions: 
Regression 2: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +  
                                  β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit + 
                                  β4POLITY2it 
 
where AFRICAi takes the value ‘1’ if country i is in Africa and ‘0’ otherwise 
           CEEURi takes the value ‘1’ if country i is in Central/Eastern Europe and ‘0’  
           otherwise 
           LATAMi takes the value ‘1’ if country i is in Latin America and ‘0’ otherwise 
           SEASIAi takes the value ‘1’ if a country i is in Southeast Asia and ‘0’  
           otherwise 
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(Here, β0 is the intercept for the omitted ‘Middle East’ group, and β5,  β6, β7 and β8 are 
the differences between the intercepts of the respective groups and the intercept of the 
Middle East group.) 
Regression 3: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +  
                                  β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +  
                                  β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITY2CEEURit +  
                                  β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit 
 
where POLITY2AFRICAit is POLITY2it multiplied by AFRICAi 
           POLITY2CEEURit is POLITY2it multiplied by CEEURi 
           POLITY2LATAMit is POLITY2it multiplied by LATAMi 
           POLITY2SEASIAit is POLITY2it multiplied by SEASIAi 
(Again, β4 is the Polity2 slope for the omitted ‘Middle East’ group, and β9,  β10, β11 
and β12 are the differences between the Polity2 slopes for the respective groups and 
the Polity2 slope for the Middle East group.) 
 Regression 2 only measures the differences in average GDP per capita among 
the different regions.  The results seem to show that, compared to countries in the 
Middle East, countries in Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia seem 
to have a lower average GDP per capita, while countries in Latin America seem to 
have a slightly larger average GDP per capita.  (We should note, however, that some 
of the values obtained are statistically insignificant.) 
 Regression 3, on the other hand, measures how economic performance 
responds to political instability in different regions.  The coefficients obtained show 
that more democracy increases GDP per capita in all five regions.  This increase, 
however, is, by far, the highest for countries in the Middle East ($396 compared to 
$36 for Africa, $60 for Central/Eastern Europe, $18 for Latin America and $54 for 
Southeast Asia for every one point increase in the Polity2 score).  Note that in both 
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regressions 2 and 3, the coefficients for the control variables (population growth, 
energy use and the number of television sets) all remained statistically significant in 
the hypothesized positive direction. 
 
An Optimal Level of Political Instability 
 Most of the theoretical background discussed in section 2.1 suggests that less 
political instability (measured by a high democracy score) leads to more economic 
growth.  But can a very high democracy score be detrimental to the economy?2 
 To examine this question and to see whether there is an ‘optimal’ Polity2 
score corresponding to the highest GDP per capita, we produced the following 
regression: 
Regression 4: 
GDP_PER_CAP = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +  
                                β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +  
                                β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITYCEEURit +  
                                β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit + β13POLITY22it                 
                               + β14POLITY22AFRICAit + β15POLITY22CEEURit +  
                               β16POLITY22LATAMit + β17POLITY22SEASIAit 
 
where POLITY22it is the signed square of POLITY2it 
           POLITY22AFRICAit is POLITY22it multiplied by AFRICAi 
           POLITY22CEEURit is POLITY22it multiplied by CEEURi 
           POLITY22LATAMit is POLITY22it multiplied by LATAMi 
           POLITY22SEASIAit is POLITY22it multiplied by SEASIAi 
 By adding the signed square of the Polity2 score and the interaction variables 
to the regression above, we can capture the relationship between political instability 
(measured by Polity2) and economic growth (measured by GDP per capita) in the 
                                                 
2 In his book The Rise and Fall of Nations, Mancur Olson, as referenced by Goldsmith (1987), 
examined this question.  According to Olson, a higher level of democracy and political freedom leads 
to the emergence of interest groups he called “distributional coalitions” whose self-seeking activities 
can be harmful to economic efficiency and growth. 
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form of five polynomials, one for each region.  From the results of regression 4, we 
obtain the following (Note: The control variables are held constant): 
For Africa:  
GDP_PER_CAPit = 26.222 + (256.6178*POLITY2it) + ( -28.1896*POLITY22it) 
For Central/Eastern Europe:  
GDP_PER_CAPit = -1347.96 + (185.7444*POLITY2it) + ( -14.8339*POLITY22it) 
For Latin America: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = 1641.928 + (699.7906*POLITY2it) + (-88.1206*POlITY22it) 
For Southeast Asia:  
GDP_PER_CAPit = 192.1722 + (-74.348*POLITY2it) + (16.70009*POLITY22it) 
For the Middle East:  
GDP_PER_CAPit = 1064.174 + (287.1965*POLITY2it) + (12.58083*POLITY22it) 
 Following are the graphs for the polynomials above within the range of all 
possible Polity2 scores (-10 to +10): 
 
      
 
      
FIGURE 1: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in Africa FIGURE 2: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in 
Central/Eastern Europe 
FIGURE 3: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in 
Latin America 
FIGURE 4: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in 
Southeast Asia 
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From the graphs above, we see that in all regions, except the Middle East, 
there seems to be an optimal level for the Polity2 score that is below 10.  In other 
words, the Middle East is the only region where increased democracy always leads to 
higher GDP per capita. 
Following are the optimal Polity2 scores for each region.  These values were 
found by using the first derivatives of the polynomials above and by looking at the 
endpoints (-10 and 10).  We can see that there are very few cases (from our data set) 
in which a country was at its region’s optimal Polity2 score: 
TABLE 2 
Optimal Polity2 scores for different regions 
Region Optimal Polity2 Score 
(rounded to the nearest 
integer) 
Examples from Data 
Africa 5 South Africa in 1990, 1991 
Central/Eastern 
Europe 
6 None 
Latin America 4 None 
Southeast Asia -10 None 
Middle East 10 Israel in 1999-2002 
 
 Note that for some regions, the optimal Polity2 score yields a negative GDP 
per capita.  This is probably due to the negative intercepts of some of the polynomials. 
 Finally, we should note that when examining the residuals from the four 
regressions above (all residual graphs can be found in the Appendix), we noticed that 
the highest residuals corresponded to observations from Israel.  Israel is considered a 
highly democratic state, yet political unrest in the Middle East in the past few years  
FIGURE 5: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in the 
Middle East 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of results for the single equation regressions# 
For all regressions: 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (constant 2000 international $) 
 Coefficient (t-statistic in parentheses) 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercepto -1027.087* 
(-3.366) 
108.439 
(0.252) 
1240.869* 
(3.228) 
1064.174* 
(2.457) 
Dummy variable for Africa - -366.259 
(-1.243) 
-1222.048* 
(-4.573) 
-1037.952* 
(-3.607) 
Dummy variable for 
Central/Eastern Europe 
- -2364.304* 
(-6.723) 
-2505.904* 
(-8.021) 
-2412.131* 
(-7.397) 
Dummy variable for Latin 
America 
- 84.720 
(0.257) 
261.320 
(0.547) 
577.754 
(1.175) 
Dummy variable for 
Southeast Asia 
- -514.600 
(-1.665) 
-1017.338* 
(-3.633) 
-872.002* 
(-2.818) 
Population growth (%, 
annual) 
778.295* 
(9.059) 
374.372* 
(3.872) 
339.930* 
(4.090) 
358.265* 
(4.195) 
Energy use (kg of oil 
equivalent per capita) 
2.928* 
(20.872) 
3.054* 
(20.627) 
2.776* 
(18.467) 
2.812* 
(16.960) 
Television sets (per 1,000 
people) 
8.276* 
(6.891) 
8.810* 
(6.790) 
8.351* 
(7.070) 
8.259* 
(6.643) 
Polity2 scoreo 153.855* 
(9.337) 
135.841* 
(7.714) 
395.680* 
(14.753) 
287.197* 
(2.224) 
Polity2 score interacted with 
‘Africa’ dummy 
- - -359.722* 
(-9.332) 
-30.578 
(-0.165) 
Polity2 score interacted with 
‘Central/Eastern Europe’ 
dummy 
- - -336.342* 
(-8.600) 
-101.452 
(-0.513) 
Polity2 score interacted with 
‘Latin America’ dummy 
- - -378.486* 
(-6.624) 
412.594 
(1.764) 
Polity2 score interacted with 
‘Southeast Asia’ dummy 
- - -342.203* 
(-8.710) 
-361.545 
(-1.940) 
Signed square of Polity2 
scoreo 
- - - 12.581 
(0.851) 
Signed square of Polity2 
score interacted with ‘Africa’ 
dummy 
- - - -40.770 
(-1.835) 
Signed square of Polity2 
score interacted with 
‘Central/Eastern Europe’ 
dummy 
- - - -27.415 
(-1.231) 
Signed square of Polity2 
score interacted with ‘Latin 
America’ dummy 
- - - -100.701* 
(-3.535) 
Signed square of Polity2 
score interacted with 
‘Southeast Asia’ dummy 
- - - 4.119 
(0.180) 
Adjusted R2 0.759 0.796 0.850 0.855 
Sample size** 396 396 396 396 
Sum of squared residuals 1.27x109 1.06x109 7.70x108 7.33x108 
# First-order serial correlation was found in some countries for different regressions. 
o In regressions which include dummy variables, the omitted group is the ‘Middle East’ group. 
* For intercepts and interaction terms: Statistically different from zero at the 5% level. / For slopes (excluding interaction terms): 
Statistically different from zero in the hypothesized direction at the 5% level. 
** The sample size was originally 450 (25 countries x 18 years), but some data were unavailable for particular countries and 
years. 
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has hindered economic growth in Israel.  In terms of our measurements, Israel has a 
high Polity2 score but a low GDP per capita.  The case of Israel is an example of why 
other forms of political instability (besides the degree to which a country is an 
autocracy or a democracy) should be considered when studying the relationship 
between instability and growth. 
6.2 Simultaneous Equations Model 
Following are the simultaneous equations that we used to examine the 
hypothesis of endogeneity (joint causality) between political instability and economic 
growth: 
Regression 5: 
GDP_PER_CAPit= α1 + α2POP_GROWTHit + α3ENG_USEit +  
                                 α4TV_PER_1Kit + α5POLITY2it 
POLITY2 = α6 + α7GDP_PER_CAPit + α8FREEDOMit 
where FREEDOMit is a country’s freedom score in a particular year. 
By running the above regression using ordinary least squares and two-stage 
least squares (with POP_GROWTH, ENG_USE, TV_PER_1K and FREEDOM as the 
instrumental variables) and comparing the resulting standard errors using the 
Hausman Test3 (shown in the Appendix), we conclude that there is no joint causality 
between political instability and economic growth.  We should note, however, that it 
is hard to obtain data on a variable that affects political instability but that is not 
correlated with economic growth.  Although we used the freedom score as one of the 
instrumental variables, there is some degree of correlation between that score and 
economic growth. 
The results of regression 5 are shown in Table 4 below: 
 
 
                                                 
3 Special thanks to Professor Gary Krueger for personally conducting the Hausman Test on my results. 
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TABLE 4 
Summary of results for the simultaneous equations regressions 
 Coefficient (t-statistic in parentheses) 
Variable Ordinary Least Squares 
Method 
Two-Stage Least Squares 
Method 
Economic growth equation 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (constant 2000 international $) 
Intercept -1027.087* 
(-3.366) 
-943.565* 
(-3.05) 
Population growth (%, annual) 778.295* 
(9.059) 
803.397* 
(9.212) 
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per 
capita) 
2.928* 
(20.872) 
2.948* 
(20.737) 
Television sets (per 1,000 people) 8.276* 
(6.891) 
6.689* 
(5.247) 
Polity2 score 153.855* 
(9.337) 
205.904* 
(9.865) 
Adjusted R2 0.759 0.753 
Sample size 396 396 
Sum of squared residuals 1.27x109 1.30x109 
Political instability equation 
Dependent variable: Polity2 score 
Intercept -9.336* 
(-27.373) 
-9.123* 
(-22.819) 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 
international $) 
0.000122* 
(2.547) 
0.000082 
(1.217) 
Freedom score 1.603* 
(30.717) 
1.610* 
(25.506) 
Adjusted R2 0.767 0.739 
Sample size 444 396 
Sum of squared residuals 4621.923 4488.549 
Result of Hausman Test: Do not reject null hypothesis of no joint correlation at 5% level** 
* For intercepts: Statistically different from zero at the 5% level. / For slopes: Statistically different from zero in the hypothesized 
direction at the 5% level. 
** At a 25% level of significance, the Hausman Test yields a result that supports joint causality.  However, we will only consider 
the result at the 5% level. 
 
The table above also shows that there is no strong effect for GDP per capita on 
the Polity2 score.  According to the two-stage least squares coefficient for GDP per 
capita in the political instability equation, it takes an increase of $10,000 in GDP per 
capita to cause only a one-point (0.82) increase in the Polity2 score.  The freedom 
score, on the other hand, has a significant effect on the Polity2 score, which is not 
surprising.  An increase in the freedom score by one point increases the Polity2 score 
by about two points (1.6).  (Note, however, that the freedom score is a fourteen-point 
score, while the Polity2 score is a twenty-one-point score.) 
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7. Conclusion and Further Research 
Using data from 1985 to 2002 from 25 countries in five different regions, we 
have found significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that political instability, 
measured by the lack of democracy, causes slower economic growth.  We could not 
conclude, however, that political instability and economic growth are endogenous and 
jointly determined. 
This paper also examined how economies in different regions respond to 
political instability.  We generated second-order polynomials relating GDP per capita 
to the Polity2 score and found the score that would generate the highest GDP per 
capita in each region.  Results varied greatly among different regions.  Southeast Asia 
had the highest GDP per capita at the lowest Polity2 score, while the Middle East had 
the highest GDP per capita at the highest Polity2 score. 
Nonetheless, this paper did not investigate the relationship between economic 
growth and other forms of instability (besides democratization).  Political instability is 
a multidimensional concept that is not very accurately captured with one variable.  
However, due to the lack of data as well as the theoretical support for measuring 
instability with the degree of democratization, we used the Polity2 score in our 
research. 
Finally, we believe future research on this subject should take into account 
region-specific measures of political instability.  Government changes may not be 
considered as signs of instability in some regions, and coup d’etats are virtually 
inexistent in others.  Furthermore, we also propose considering the effects of political 
instability in neighboring countries on economic growth.  Many economies suffer 
greatly due to nearby conflicts and not any domestic instability. 
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Finally, the relationship between economic performance and political 
instability is very complex.  In this paper, we have shown that at least some degree of 
political instability (measured by the lack of democratization) can be detrimental to 
growth in the economy. 
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Appendix 
E-Views Regression Outputs and Residual Graphs 
 
Regression 1: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0+β1POP_GRWOTHit+β2ENG_USEit+β3TV_PER_1Kit+β4POLITY2it 
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP  
Date: 05/04/05   Time: 13:22   
Sample: 1 450    
Included observations: 396   
Excluded observations: 54   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -1027.087 305.1321 -3.366039 0.0008 
POP_GROWTH 778.2946 85.91299 9.059102 0 
ENG_USE 2.928322 0.140301 20.87169 0 
TV_PER_1K 8.275814 1.200964 6.890975 0 
POLITY2 153.855 16.47887 9.3365 0 
     
R-squared 0.761133     Mean dependent var 5835.141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758689     S.D. dependent var 3661.693 
S.E. of regression 1798.748     Akaike info criterion 15.00224 
Sum squared resid 1.27E+09     Schwartz criterion 15.05251 
Log likelihood -3527.343     F-statistic 311.4733 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.176476     Prob(F-statistic) 0 
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Regression 2: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +  
                                  β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit + 
                                  β4POLITY2it 
 
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP  
Date: 05/04/05   Time: 13:24   
Sample: 1 450    
Included observations: 396   
Excluded observations: 54   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 108.4387 429.8966 0.252244 0.801 
AFRICA -366.259 294.6774 -1.242915 0.2147 
CEEUR -2364.304 351.6637 -6.723196 0 
LATAM 84.72033 330.0281 0.256706 0.7975 
SEASIA -514.5997 309.1028 -1.664817 0.0968 
POP_GROWTH 374.3721 96.69357 3.871737 0.0001 
ENG_USE 3.054197 0.14807 20.62667 0 
TV_PER_1K 8.810441 1.297655 6.78951 0 
POLITY2 135.8405 17.60915 7.714199 0 
     
R-squared 0.800277     Mean dependent var 5835.141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796149     S.D. dependent var 3661.693 
S.E. of regression 1653.251     Akaike info criterion 14.84346 
Sum squared resid 1.06E+09     Schwartz criterion 14.93395 
Log likelihood -3491.905     F-statistic 193.8358 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.15001     Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
F Test4 Comparing Regressions 1 and 2: 
F value = [(1.27x109-1.06x109)/4] / [1.06x109/(396-8-1)] = 19.2 
F critical = 3.32 
F value > F critical (Region intercepts significantly reduced SSR) 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 All F tests in this appendix have the null hypothesis that the added coefficients in the second 
(unconstrained) regression are not statistically different from zero.  This null hypothesis is rejected with 
an F value greater than the critical value. 
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Regression 3: 
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +  
                                  β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +  
                                  β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITY2CEEURit +  
                                  β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit 
 
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP  
Date: 05/04/05   Time: 13:25   
Sample: 1 450    
Included observations: 396   
Excluded observations: 54   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 1240.869 384.3982 3.228081 0.0014 
AFRICA -1222.048 267.239 -4.572867 0 
CEEUR -2505.904 312.4209 -8.020924 0 
LATAM 261.3203 477.4627 0.54731 0.5845 
SEASIA -1017.338 280.0549 -3.632636 0.0003 
POP_GROWTH 339.9304 83.11448 4.089906 0.0001 
ENG_USE 2.775928 0.150314 18.46748 0 
TV_PER_1K 8.351052 1.1812 7.069976 0 
POLITY2 395.68 26.81959 14.7534 0 
POLITY2AFRICA -359.7217 38.54642 -9.332169 0 
POLITY2CEEUR -336.342 39.109 -8.600118 0 
POLITY2LATAM -378.4859 60.41975 -6.264275 0 
POLITY2SEASIA -342.2033 39.28691 -8.710363 0 
     
R-squared 0.854675     Mean dependent var 5835.141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850122     S.D. dependent var 3661.693 
S.E. of regression 1417.593     Akaike info criterion 14.54571 
Sum squared resid 7.70E+08     Schwartz criterion 14.67641 
Log likelihood -3428.95     F-statistic 187.7058 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.157658     Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
F Test Comparing Regressions 2 and 3: 
F value = [(1.06x109-7.70x108)/4] / [7.70x108/(396-12-1)] = 36.1 
F critical = 3.32 
F value > F critical (Interacting Polity2 with the region dummies significantly 
reduced SSR) 
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Regression 4: 
GDP_PER_CAP = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +  
                                β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +  
                                β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITYCEEURit +  
                                β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit + β13POLITY22it                 
                               + β14POLITY22AFRICAit + β15POLITY22CEEURit +  
                               β16POLITY22LATAMit + β17POLITY22SEASIAit 
 
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP  
Date: 05/04/05   Time: 13:27   
Sample: 1 450    
Included observations: 396   
Excluded observations: 54   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 1064.174 433.1838 2.456633 0.0145 
AFRICA -1037.952 287.7742 -3.606826 0.0004 
CEEUR -2412.131 326.0768 -7.39743 0 
LATAM 577.7543 491.7291 1.174944 0.2408 
SEASIA -872.0018 309.4925 -2.817521 0.0051 
POP_GROWTH 358.2648 85.41218 4.194539 0 
ENG_USE 2.811611 0.165779 16.96001 0 
TV_PER_1K 8.259081 1.243341 6.642651 0 
POLITY2 287.1965 129.139 2.223933 0.0267 
POLITY2AFRICA -30.57875 185.4774 -0.164865 0.8691 
POLITY2CEEUR -101.4521 197.6356 -0.513329 0.608 
POLITY2LATAM 412.5941 233.963 1.763501 0.0786 
POLITY2SEASIA -361.5445 186.333 -1.940314 0.0531 
SQPOLITY2 12.58083 14.78552 0.850888 0.3954 
SQPOLITY2AFRICA -40.77043 22.21569 -1.835209 0.0673 
SQPOLITY2CEEUR -27.41469 22.27362 -1.230815 0.2192 
SQPOLITY2LATAM -100.7014 28.48635 -3.535075 0.0005 
SQPOLITY2SEASIA 4.119261 22.92887 0.179654 0.8575 
     
R-squared 0.861649     Mean dependent var 5835.141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.855427     S.D. dependent var 3661.693 
S.E. of regression 1392.276     Akaike info criterion 14.52178 
Sum squared resid 7.33E+08     Schwartz criterion 14.70275 
Log likelihood -3419.212     F-statistic 138.4816 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.179326     Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
 
F Test Comparing Regressions 3 and 4: 
F value = [(7.70x108-7.33x108)/5] / [7.33x108/(396-17-1)] = 3.82 
F critical = 3.32 
F value > F critical (Adding the signed square of Polity2 and interacting it with 
the region dummies significantly reduced SSR) 
 
 
 
Residual graph shown on next page. 
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Regression 5: 
GDP_PER_CAPit= α1 + α2POP_GROWTHit + α3ENG_USEit +  
                                 α4TV_PER_1Kit + α5POLITY2it 
 
POLITY2 = α6 + α7GDP_PER_CAPit + α8FREEDOMit 
(Instrumental variables: POP_GROWTHit, ENG_USEit, TV_PER_1Kit, FREEDOMit) 
 
Ordinary least squares method: Output and residuals graph: 
 
System: SYSTEM    
Estimation Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 450      
Date: 05/04/05   Time: 13:29   
     
 Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
C(1) -1027.087 305.1321 -3.366039 0.0008 
C(2) 778.2946 85.91299 9.059102 0 
C(3) 2.928322 0.140301 20.87169 0 
C(4) 8.275814 1.200964 6.890975 0 
C(5) 153.855 16.47887 9.3365 0 
C(6) -9.335891 0.341062 -27.37299 0 
C(7) 0.000122 4.81E-05 2.547417 0.011 
C(8) 1.602985 0.052186 30.71687 0 
     
Determinant residual covariance 31631232   
     
Equation: GDP_PER_CAP = C(1) + C(2)*POP_GROWTH + C(3)*ENG_USE  
    + C(4)*TV_PER_1K + C(5)*POLITY2   
Observations: 396    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
R-squared 0.761133     Mean dependent var 5835.141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758689     S.D. dependent var 3661.693 
S.E. of regression 1798.748     Sum squared resid 1.27E+09 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.176476    
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Equation: POLITY2 = C(6) + C(7)*GDP_PER_CAP + C(8)*FREEDOM 
Observations: 444    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
R-squared 0.767649     Mean dependent var 2.094595 
Adjusted R-squared 0.766596     S.D. dependent var 6.70097 
S.E. of regression 3.237368     Sum squared resid 4621.923 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.396066    
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Two-stage least squares method: Output and residuals graph: 
System: SYSTEM    
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Instruments: POP_GROWTH ENG_USE TV_PER_1K FREEDOM C 
Sample: 1 450      
Date: 05/04/05   Time: 13:30   
     
 Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
C(1) -943.5646 309.6544 -3.047154 0.0024 
C(2) 803.3967 87.21193 9.212004 0 
C(3) 2.947993 0.142159 20.73734 0 
C(4) 6.688642 1.27486 5.246572 0 
C(5) 205.9035 20.87231 9.864912 0 
C(6) -9.122731 0.399791 -22.81875 0 
C(7) 8.20E-05 6.74E-05 1.217015 0.224 
C(8) 1.610054 0.063124 25.50601 0 
     
Determinant residual covariance 33864897   
     
Equation: GDP_PER_CAP = C(1) + C(2)*POP_GROWTH + C(3)*ENG_USE  
    + C(4)*TV_PER_1K + C(5)*POLITY2   
Observations: 396    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
R-squared 0.755038     Mean dependent var 5835.141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.752532     S.D. dependent var 3661.693 
S.E. of regression 1821.55     Sum squared resid 1.30E+09 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.186121    
     
Equation: POLITY2 = C(6) + C(7)*GDP_PER_CAP + C(8)*FREEDOM 
Observations: 396    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
R-squared 0.740193     Mean dependent var 2.353535 
Adjusted R-squared 0.738871     S.D. dependent var 6.61347 
S.E. of regression 3.379533     Sum squared resid 4488.549 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.332325    
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The Hausman Test on Regression 5 
(Special thanks to Professor Gary Krueger for personally conducting the Hausman 
test on my results) 
 
Null hypothesis: GDP per capita and Polity2 are not jointly correlated 
Alternative hypothesis: GDP per capita and Polity2 are jointly correlated 
 
Critical value: 1.97 
 
Measured values: 
 
Confidence Level Value Conclusion 
99% 6.63 Do not reject null hypothesis 
97.5% 5.02 Do not reject null hypothesis 
95% 3.84 Do not reject null hypothesis 
90% 2.71 Do not reject null hypothesis 
75% 1.32 Reject null hypothesis 
 
The Polity2 Score 
Following is part of the description of the Polity2 score, as well as the Polity, 
Democ, and Autoc scores on which Polity2 is based.  These descriptions are all 
from the Dataset Users’ Manual of the Polity IV Project, prepared by Monty G. 
Marshall of the University of Maryland, College Park and Keith Jaggers of Colorado 
State University in 2002.  For a full description of all Polity IV variables, visit 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. 
 
POLITY2 
Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY 
variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-
series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple 
treatment, or “fix”, to convert instances of  “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -
77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). 
 
POLITY 
Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC 
score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
 
 
DEMOC 
Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, 
interdependent elements.  One is the presence of institutions and procedures through 
which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. 
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive.  Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives 
and in acts of political participation.  Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the 
rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are 
means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include 
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coded data on civil liberties.  The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point 
scale (0-10). 
 
AUTOC 
Institutionalized Autocracy: "Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a 
pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common 
properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political 
freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in 
terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics.  In mature form, 
autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief 
executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, 
and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most 
modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and 
economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, 
not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high 
degrees of directiveness.  We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the 
question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have 
covaried over time.  An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. 
 
 
The Data Set 
The next thirteen pages include the complete data set used in this research. 
 
 
 
